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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Appellant Gloria Martineau appeals from the September 26,
2001, Order issued by the Honorable Kay L. Mclff of the Sixth Judicial District Court, Sanpete County, State of Utah.

Jurisdiction

for the Utah Supreme Court to decide this appeal exists under
Art. VIII, §§ 3 and 5, of the Utah Constitution, and Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1996), because the district court's Order is
a final ruling that determines all of the issues in the case.
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The issues in this appeal are:
1.

Did the district court err in ruling that the 7-year

period for adverse possession under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-8,
et seq., does not apply to a statutory claim of adverse possession
of a claimed easement and, thus, in denying defendant's motion for
summary judgment and in granting plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment?

This question presents an issue of law that is reviewed

for correctness.

See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah

1993); Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447,
455 (Utah 1993).

This issue was preserved below.

(See R 84-85,

94-100, 198-206.)
2.

Did the district court err in granting plaintiff's motion

for summary judgment when the undisputed facts showed over 30 years
of adverse use or, in the alternative, when genuine issues of material fact exist concerning whether adverse use continued for over
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20 years? This issue involves a question of law to be reviewed for
correctness.

See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235

(Utah 1993).

This issue was preserved below.

(See R 84-36, 98-

100, 204-206.)
3.

Did the district court err in granting plaintiff's motion

for summary judgment when genuine issues of material fact exist
concerning whether plaintiff had abandoned his claimed easement?
This issue raises a question of law and is to be reviewed for
correctness.

See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235

(Utah 1993). This issue was preserved below.

(See R 84-85, 95-96,

206-208.)
III.

DETERMINATIVE AND CENTRALLY IMPORTANT AUTHORITY

Utah's adverse possession statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-7,
-8, -9 and -12 (1953), is determinative and of central importance
with respect to the adverse possession issue presented in this
appeal.
IV.
A.

Nature of Case.

STATEMENT OF CASE
Plaintiff claims an easement by neces-

sity across a portion of defendant's property located in Sanpete
County, Utah.

(R 2-4. J1

Defendant maintains that the easement

defendant does not deny that, many years ago, there was a
unity of title between plaintiff's property and defendant's property, and that an access way once existed across the eastern boundary of defendant's property for purposes of ingress and egress to
and from plaintiff's property. (See R 50.)
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claimed by plaintiff was abandoned in the late 1930s or early 1940s
and that, in any event, was lost through adverse possession which
continued throughout the period from at least the mid-1960s to the
present time.

(R 84-102, 198-229.)

Plaintiff filed his Complaint

in this action on August 4, 1997, long after the statutory 7-year
period for adverse possession had run against him and his predecessors-in-interest.
B.

(See R 1.)

Proceedings Below. By its Order entered on September 26,

2001, the district court granted plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment and denied defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment.
(R 288-295.)

The court ruled that (a) plaintiff and his prede-

cessors -in- interest did not abandon the claimed easement, and
(b) defendant did not adversely possess the easement claimed by
plaintiff because (i) the 20-year period for a prescriptive easement applies to adverse possession of an easement, rather than the
7-year statutory period for adverse possession, and (ii) defendant's adverse possession only occurred over a period of 15 years,
rather than the required 20 years.

(R 293-294.)

In making its

ruling, the district court ignored undisputed facts and misapplied
the law.

Defendant timely filed her notice of appeal from the

Order on October 26, 2001.
C.

(R 299.)

Statement of Facts.

In 1986, plaintiff acquired a one-

acre parcel of property located in Sanpete County, Utah ("Plaintiff's Property").

(R 219, 1 28.)

Defendant's 20-acre parcel

("Defendant's Property") adjoins Plaintiff's Property on the north,
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west and south.
1992.

(R 103.)

Defendant purchased her property in

(R 217, 219, 11 21, 28.)

A county road runs east and west

along the northern boundary of Defendant's Property.

(Id.)

Up until the late 1930s or early 1940s, the owners of Plaintiff's Property apparently used an access way along the eastern
edge of Defendant's Property to reach the house on Plaintiff's
Property.

(R 66-68.)

At some point in the late 1930s or early

1940s, the Andersons, the then owners of Plaintiff's Property,
moved from that property.

From that point on, no one lived in the

house on Plaintiff's Property, nor did anyone maintain the house or
use the property.

(R 214, 217, 11 7 and 17.)

Following the move,

long-time residents of the area understood that Plaintiff's Property had been abandoned.

(R 214-215, 1 8.)

Over the years, the

house began to deteriorate and crumble to a point where animals
began to use the house for shelter and, even plaintiff later acknowledged in correspondence that the house had been "abandoned."
(R 214-215, 1 8.)

Also, a huge rock pile has existed on the south

side of the old house from at least the mid-1960s until the present
time, taking up a very large portion of Plaintiff's Property and
making that portion unusable.

(R 214-215, 1 8.)

Defendant's predecessors, the Nortons, purchased Defendant's
Property in the mid-1960s.

(R 213, 1 4.)

From the time of their

purchase, the Nortons maintained a fence across the entire northern
boundary of Defendant's Property adjacent to the county road and
across the eastern portion of Defendant's Property on which plain-
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tiff now claims he has an easement.

(R 217-218, 1 19.)

Since

the Andersons moved from Plaintiff's Property in the late 1930s or
early 1940s, no one, except for the Nortons and people who were
working for the Nortons, used the eastern portion of Defendant's
Property.

(R 215, 1 9.) Beginning in the mid-1960s and continuing

until the time the Nortons sold Defendant's Property to defendant,
the Nortons used the entire property to graze animals almost 100%
of the time.

(R 215, 1 9.)

When the Nortons purchased Defendant's Property in the mid1960s, cows were living in the dilapidated house on Plaintiff's
Property.

(R 215, % 11.)

It had no doors or windows at the time

and has continued to deteriorate from the mid-1960s until the
present time.

(R 215, H 11.)

Also, when the Nortons purchased

Defendant's Property, it showed no evidence of an easement across
the eastern portion of the property to the old house on Plaintiff's
Property.

(R 216, 1 12.)

The Nortons used the entire 20-acre

field comprising Defendant's Property continuously from the time
they purchased the property until they sold it to defendant. (Id.)
From the mid-1960s until 1992, no vehicles drove over the
portion of Defendant's Property claimed by plaintiff as an easement, and the Nortons maintained a fence along the south side of
the county road and never permitted anyone to use any portion of
Defendant's Property as an easement or otherwise.

(R 216, 1 13.)

The fence was closed and wired shut at all times so no one could
use Defendant's Property as an easement, as claimed by plaintiff.
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(Id.)

Cleon Rigby, a long-time resident of the area, never saw

anyone pull back the fence along the county road or gain access
through the fence to Plaintiff's Property.

(R 215, 1 10.)

Once or twice a year, the Nortons pulled the fence back from
the corner near the northeast end of Defendant's Property, on which
plaintiff claims an easement existed, to let their cattle and
horses in and out of their field.

(R 216, H 14.) Except when the

Nortons pulled the fence back for that purpose, they kept the fence
closed at all times to contain their animals which they kept in the
field,

(Id.)

The Nortons never permitted an opening to exist in

the fence for an access easement to Plaintiff's Property, and at no
time did they permit anyone to gain access across their property
to the old house on Plaintiff's Property.

(R 217, H 15.)

At all times from the mid-1960s until they sold Defendant's
Property to defendant, the Nortons treated the full 20 acres as
their property and paid taxes on the entire property, including
the portion plaintiff now claims as an easement.

(R 217, 1 16.)

During that entire time, it was obvious to the Nortons that Plaintiff's Property had long since been abandoned.

(R 217, K 17.)

No one ever attempted to remodel the house, construct any improvements on Plaintiff's Property, or use that property.

(Id.)

During the period from the mid-1960s until 1992, the Nortons
also plowed the entire 20-acre field on Defendant's Property,
including the portion where plaintiff claims an easement existed,
and planted grass on the property up to the east fence.
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(R 217,

1 18.)

At all relevant times, the Nortons also continuously used

Defendant's Property as pasture for their animals, again including
the portion claimed by plaintiff as an easement.

(R 217-218,

1 19.) The Nortons were the exclusive users of the entire 20-acre
parcel.

(Id.)

At one point in the early 1980s, Mr. Norton observed a lady
walking on the eastern portion of Defendant's Property.
1 4.)

(R 213,

When Mr. Norton approached her, she identified herself as

Mrs. Mower.

(Id.) Mr. Norton talked to her and told her that she

could not trespass on and cross Defendant's Property.
to the Nortons.

(Id.)

It belonged

When she stated that she had a right to

gain access to the old house on Plaintiff's Property, Mr. Norton
informed her that she could not do so, that she would have to find
access elsewhere, and that she would have to get a court order
before trespassing again.

(Id.)

Mr. Norton then put a lock on

the fence to keep her or anyone else from pulling the fence back
and to ensure that no one would cross the east end of the Norton
property to get to the old house.

(Id.)

He had earlier put up

"No Trespassing11 signs on the fence along the county road.

(Id.)

Approximately 15 years passed between the time of Mr. Norton's
conversation with Mrs. Mower and the time plaintiff filed his
Complaint in the present action.

(See R 1.)

Since the time of defendant's purchase of Defendant's Property
in 1992, defendant continuously and exclusively used her property
for pasture for animals and for other ordinary uses in connection
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with her farming operations.

(R 218, 1 23.)

That property was

enclosed at all times by a wire and wood post fence which was
capable of containing livestock.

(Id.) Defendant never permitted

anyone to use any portion of her property at any time.

(Xd.)

Shortly after defendant purchased Defendant's Property, she
removed a portion of the fence in the northeast corner of her property and installed a metal gate with a lock so that only her family
could access her property at that point.

(Id.; R 218-219, H 24.)

At no time since the purchase did defendant permit anyone to gain
access across her property to the old house on Plaintiff's Property.

(R 219, 1 25.) At all times, she intended to prevent anyone

from crossing her property and did not leave the gate open at any
time.

(Id.) She also treated Defendant's Property in its emtirety

as her property and paid the taxes on the entire property, including the portion plaintiff claims as an easement.

(R 219, 1 26.)

Defendant purchased Defendant's Property under the terms of
a warranty deed.

(R 219, 1 28.) None of the deeds in the chain of

title to Plaintiff's Property or to Defendant's Property show any
reference to the easement claimed by plaintiff in this action.
(R 220, 1 29.)
V.
A.

Utah's

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Adverse

Possession

Statute,

Utah

Code Ann.

§§ 78-12-7, et seq. (1953), is specific and unambiguous.

It only

requires a showing of adverse possession for 7 years in order to
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acquire title by adverse possession.

Defendant presented un-

disputed facts showing that she and her predecessors adversely
possessed the easement claimed by plaintiff for a period far exceeding the statutory 7 years. The district court, however, ruled
that the 7-year statutory period does not apply to adverse possession of an easement and that the common law period of 20 years for
a prescriptive easement governs. The court erred in these rulings
and should not have granted summary judgment in plaintiff's favor.
B.

The district court also erred in granting plaintiff's

motion for summary judgment, even assuming the 20-year period for
a prescriptive easement applies to a statutory claim of adverse
possession of an easement. The undisputed facts show that adverse
use continued for over 30 years. To the extent plaintiff can show
that he presented facts to the contrary, genuine issues of material
fact exist, thus precluding summary judgment.
C.

The district court further erred in concluding, as a

matter of law, that the easement claimed by plaintiff had not been
abandoned. The undisputed facts presented by defendant showed that
even plaintiff acknowledged that the old, dilapidated home on his
property had been "abandoned."

Also, over a period of at least

30 years, he and his predecessors permitted defendant and her predecessors to build a fence blocking the claimed easement, to put up
"No Trespassing" signs on the fence, to plow and plant grass over
the claimed easement, to graze cattle on all of Defendant's Property, and to deprive all parties from accessing Plaintiff's Prop-
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erty across the claimed easement.

These facts demonstrate the

intent required to show abandonment.

At the very least, they

create disputed fact issues that require a trial.

VI.
A.

ARGUMENTS

The District Court Erred In Ruling That The 7-Year Period
For Adverse Possession Under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-7,
Et Seq. (1953). Does Not Apply To A Statutory Claim Of
Adverse Possession Of The Claimed Easement, In Denying
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, And In Granting
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-8 (1953) provides:
Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those
under whom he claims, entered into possession of the
property under claim of title, exclusive of other right,
founding such claim upon a written instrument as being a
conveyance of the property in question . . . and that there
has been a continued occupation and possession of the
property included in such instrument . . . for seven years,
the property so included is deemed to have been held
adversely. . . . [Emphasis added.]
Section 78-12-9 defines what constitutes adverse possession under
a written instrument:
For the purpose of constituting an adverse
sion by any person claiming a title founded
written instrument or a judgment or decree,
deemed to have been possessed and occupied
following cases:

possesupon a
land is
in the

(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or
improved.
(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
(3) Where, although not enclosed, it has been
used for . . . the purpose of husbandry, or for
pasturage or for the ordinary use of the occupant.
Under Section 78-12-12, a party claiming adverse possession must
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show "that the land has been occupied and claimed for the period
of 7 years continuously, and that the party, his predecessors and
grantors have paid all taxes which have been levied and assessed
upon such land according to law."
As shown by the undisputed facts summarized above, each of the
requirements to establish adverse possession has been satisfied.
Defendant acquired Defendant's Property by a written instrument
within the meaning of Section 78-12-8.

(R 219, 1 28.)

Defendant

and her predecessors also paid all property taxes as required by
Section 78-12-12.

(R 217, 219, 11 16 and 26.)

There is no dis-

pute that during the 15-year period from Mr. Norton's conversation
with Mrs. Mower in approximately 1982 until plaintiff filed his
complaint on July 31, 1997, there was continued adverse occupation
and possession of Defendant's Property by the Nortons and defendant.

Even plaintiff and the district court concluded that when

Mr. Norton refused to permit Mrs. Mower to enter Defendant's Property in 1982, this encounter was sufficient to start the period
of adverse possession to run.

(R 205-206, 289, 293-294.)

During this 15-year period, plaintiff also acknowledged,
by failing to present any contrary facts, that (a) Defendant's
Property was protected by a substantial inclosure or fence to
contain defendant's and the Nortons' farm animals (R 218, 1 19),
and (b) that all of Defendant's Property was also used continuously
for the purpose of husbandry and for pasturage and the ordinary use
of the Nortons and defendant.

(See R 215-219, 11 9, 12, 14, 16,
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18, 19, 23 and 26.)

Based upon these undisputed facts and as a

matter of law, plaintiff's claimed easement has therefore been
extinguished by adverse possession under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-8,
-9 and -12.

The period of adverse use in the form of continuous

cultivation, protection of Defendant's Property by a "substantial
inclosure," and use of the property "for the purpose of husbandry,
or for pasturage or for the ordinary use of the occupant" extended
continuously over a period in excess of 7 years.
By sidestepping the express 7-year statutory period of Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-8, the district court incorrectly applied the
20-year, common law period for acquiring a prescriptive easement.
(See R 292-294.)

To support its position, the court stated that

"[t]he early Utah case of Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227 [26
P. 291] (Utah 1891), flatly states:

'This statute [Utah Code Ann.

§§ 78-12-8 and -12] does not apply to rights of way or any other
class of easement by prescription.'"

(R 292-294.)

The district court's application of that statement in Harkness
to the present case, however, is based on a misreading of Harkness.
In Harkness. the plaintiff sought to invoke the adverse possession statute, with its applicable 7-year period of adverse use, to
obtain a prescriptive easement across defendant's property. Harkness, 26 P. at 292.

In rejecting use of the statute in that way,

the Utah territorial Court noted that uninterrupted possession for
20 years is required for a prescriptive easement and the 7-year
statute does not apply.

(See id.)
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The Court stated that "unless

it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed for
a period of 7 years continuously," "in no case shall adverse possession be considered established."

(Id.)2

The Court went on to

observe:
The statute does not, in effect, presume a grant and
give the person relying upon it the title from seven
years7 possession alone. The presumption is made from
the fact that the land was held adversely; and to make
the holding adverse the land must have been protected by
a substantial inclosure, or it must have been usually
cultivated or improved. . . . [Emphasis added.]
Id. at 293.
In addition, the Court emphasized that "occupation and claim
must have been continuous for the 7 years, and during that time the
claimant, his predecessors or grantors, must have paid all taxes
levied and assessed upon the land according to law." Id. Because
a party claiming a prescriptive easement (a) does not "hold" the
land adversely by protecting the land by a substantial inclosure
or by cultivating the land, and (b) does not pay taxes on the land,
the Court concluded that "[t]his statute does not apply to rightsof-way or any other class of easement by prescription."

See id.

Thus, a party claiming a prescriptive easement cannot obtain such
an easement after the 7-year period for adverse possession has
passed. The territorial court's statement in Harkness has nothing
to do with whether the 7-year statute of limitations under Utah's

2

The statutory provisions quoted by the Court in 1891 were
very similar to those in the present Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-7, -10
and -12.
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adverse possession statute applies to extinguishment of an easement
by adverse possession.
The district court in the present case, therefore, erroneously
applied the above statement in Harkness to this case and incorrectly concluded that the 20-year common law period for a prescriptive
easement governs a statutory claim of adverse possession of an
easement. In reaching these highly unusual conclusions, the district court ignored the express language of Section 78-12-8 which
makes it clear that " [w]henever it appears that the occupant . . .
entered into possession of the property under a claim of title, . .
and there has been a continued occupation and possession of the
property . . . for 7 years, the property so included is deemed to
ave been held adversely. ..."

The statute is specific and plain.

It expressly permits extinguishment of any "other right" after
7 years of adverse possession.

Plaintiff's claimed easement is

such a right. Thus, that easement, to the extent it ever existed,
has been extinguished by adverse possession, and the district
court's judgment must be reversed and judgment entered in favor of
defendant.
B.

The Trial Court Erred In Granting Plaintiff's Motion For
Summary Judgment, Even If The 20-Year Statute of Limitations Were Applied To A Claim Of Adverse Possession,
Because Over 30 Years' Adverse Use Occurred Or, At The
Very Least, Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist Concerning Whether Adverse Use Continued For Over 30 Years.

The undisputed facts in the present case show conclusively
that the adverse use of plaintiff's claimed easement by the Nortons
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and then by defendant was continuous for a period of over 30 years.
(See R 215-219, 11 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 23 and 24.)

As

stated by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-9(1) through (3), adverse possession exists when the land "has been usually cultivated or improved, " where "it has been protected by a substantial inclosure,"
or where "it has been used for . . . the purpose of husbandry or for
pasturage or for the ordinary use of the occupant."

It is undis-

puted that Defendant's Property was used adversely and continuously
for each of those statutory purposes for the 30-year period commencing in the mid-1960s through the time of the filing of plaintiff's Complaint in this action in 1997.

(See id.)3

In Johnson v. Bellf 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983), this Court held
that the conduct of plaintiffs' predecessors in grazing cattle on
their property, fencing a part of the property, repairing fences,
plowing a part of the property, and paying taxes on the property
was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of title by adverse
possession.

Id. at 311-12.

The undisputed facts in the present

3

Defendant did not "agree," contrary to what the district
court stated, that the confrontation in 1982 between Mr. Norton and
Mrs. Mower, or the "moment of truth," was the event that "started
the clock to run."
(See R 84-86, 98-100, 204-206.) Defendant
contended, in light of plaintiff's own admission, that the clock,
at the very least, started to run in 1982. The 15-year period
between that time and the time of filing plaintiff's Complaint in
1997, therefore, demonstrated conclusively that the 7-year period
under Utah's adverse possession statute had run. (R Id.) Defendant also contended that adverse possession had been continuous
for a period of over 30 years--from the mid-1960s when the Nortons
acquired Defendant's Property until the present time.
(R Id.)
Defendant took the position that the 30-year period far exceeded
even the 20-year statute of limitations the district court held was
applicable to defendant's claim of adverse possession. (R Id.)
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case are even more compelling than those in Johnson and satisfy
each of the statutory elements of adverse possession. Those facts
show, even if the requirement of a 20-year period of adverse use
were applied, the Nortons' and defendant's adverse use satisfied
that requirement.

Adverse use continued for over 30 continuous

years (from the mid-1960s until the present time), as shown by the
following undisputed facts:
1.

The claimed easement was continuously blocked off by

a fence when the Nortons owned Defendant's Property, and by a
gate when defendant owned the property.

(R 213-219, HI 4, 10,

13, 14, 19, 23 and 24.)
2.

Neither the Nortons nor defendant permitted any

other person to use Defendant's Property for any purpose,
including access to Plaintiff's Property.

(R 216-219, H 13,

14, 15, 16, 22, 23 and 25.)
3.

The Nortons kept horses or cattle on Defendant's

Property nearly 100% of the time during the entire period
they owned the property. They fenced the property to contain
the animals and continuously occupied Defendant's Property in
its entirety for their own use.

(R 215-218, 1H 9, 12, 13, 14,

15, 16, 18 and 19.)
4.

The Nortons also continuously maintained a fence

along the entire northern portion of their property.

They

pulled a portion of that fence open only once or twice a
year to permit their farm animals to leave or enter the
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property through the temporary opening in the fence.

(R 216,

1 14.)
5.
grass.

The Nortons plowed the entire property and planted
The plowed area included the portion plaintiff now

claims as an easement.
6.

(R 216-218, 11 13, 18 and 19.)

When defendant purchased Defendant's Property in

1992, she continuously and exclusively used the property for
the pasture of animals in connection with family farming
operations. The property was enclosed at all times by a wire
and wood post fence which was capable of containing livestock,
and the fence ran along the entire south side of the county
road adjacent to her property.

She did not permit anyone

else to use any portion of her property.
7.

(R 218, 1 23.)

Defendant and the Nortons never let any third

parties use Defendant's Property.
19, 23, 25.)

(R 216-219, 11 13, 14, 15,

When a lady identified as Mrs. Mower entered

Defendant's Property in the early 1980s, Mr. Norton informed
her that she had no right to trespass on the property.

When

she claimed she needed to use the Norton property to gain
access to Plaintiff's Property, Mr. Norton informed her that
she had no right to do so and that if she disagreed, she would
need to obtain a court order.

Mr. Norton then put a lock on

the end of the fence where he had opened the fence to let his
animals in and out of Defendant's Property.

"No Trespassing"

signs located on the fence along the north boundary of Defen-
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dant's Property and installed by Mr. Norton prior to his
encounter with Mrs. Mower, also made it clear that no one
could enter Defendant's Property.

(R 213, 1 4.)

Thus, from the mid-1960s through at least July 31, 1997, when
plaintiff filed his Complaint in the present action, such statutory
adverse possession of the claimed easement by the Nortons, and
subsequently by defendant, extinguished the right, if any ever
existed, to use the easement which plaintiff claims.

Such pos-

session, "exclusive of other right" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-8,
adversely possessed the claimed easement as a matter of law. Because the district court improperly granted summary judgment in
plaintiff's favor, that judgment should be reversed and judgment
should be entered in defendant's favor declaring that the claimed
easement has been adversely possessed and does not exist.
To the extent plaintiff claims he presented any facts to the
contrary, then, and only then, there would be disputed issues of
material fact as to whether the Nortons' and defendant's adverse
use continued for at least 20 years. It was error for the district
court, in either event, to ignore defendant's facts presented by
affidavit and to grant summary judgment, concluding that the
adverse possession did not continue for 20 years.

The district

court's judgment must be reversed and judgment entered in favor
of defendant.

At the very least, the judgment must be reversed

so that any factual disputes can be resolved at trial.
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C.

The Trial Court Erred In Granting Plaintiff's Motion For
Summary Judgment Because Genuine Issues Of Material Fact
Exist Concerning Whether Plaintiff's Claimed Easement Had
Been Abandoned.

In Western Gateway Storage Co. v. Treseder, 567 P.2d 181, 182
(Utah 1977), this Court stated:

ff

[i]t is well recognized that an

easement or right of way may be abandoned."

See also Dahnken v.

George Romney & Sons Co., 184 P.2d 211, 215 (Utah 1947) . Although
defendant has been unable to locate any Utah appellate court decisions concerning abandonment of an easement by necessity, the Court
in Treseder stated that a right gained by conveyance "may not be
lost by non-use alone and that an actual intent to abandon be
evident."

567 P.2d at 182. An easement by necessity should have

no greater standing than an easement acquired by conveyance, and
would equally be subject to the law of abandonment.
Jurisdictions recognizing that an easement by necessity may
be abandoned have concluded that abandonment "will be found where
there is manifested a clear intent, expressed or through acts of
relinquishment, to abandon."

See, e.g., Pencader Assoc, Inc. v.

Glasgow Trust, 446 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Del. 1982).

According to the

Court in Pencader,
' [n] o particular conduct is required, but the . . .conduct
[by the grantee] must be inconsistent with one's right to
use and enjoy the easement,7 such as: (1) the maintenance of locked gates across the way; (2) the building of
fences blocking the way; or (3) the erection of buildings
blocking the way.
Id.; see also Stozenski v. Borough of Forty-Fort, Luzerne County.
317 A.2d 602, 605 (Pa. 1974).
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In addition, courts have found that evidence of an easement
holder's non-use of an easement and acquiescence to the servient
property owner's obstruction of an easement for a long period of
time will justify a finding of abandonment. In Comeau v. Manzelli,
182 N.E.2d 487 (Mass. 1962), for example, the Court ruled that a
finding of abandonment of an easement was warranted where the old
right-of-way had been closed for over 20 years and had been obstructed by a fence with no gate, and trees had been planted in
the easement area.

Id. at 491.

Similarly, in Sindlar v. William M. Bailey Co., 204 N.E.2d
717 (Mass. 1965), the evidence showed that for over 35 years the
easement holder permitted an adjoining landowner to use the easement area in a manner inconsistent with its use as a way, including the erection of fences to enclose the way.

Jd. at 720. That

evidence established the easement holder's intent to abandon its
rights to the private road and not to make further use of it. In
addition to the easement claimant's non-use, the court pointed to
the claimant's acquiescence to the adverse use of the area by the
adjoining landowner as evidence warranting the conclusion that the
easement had been abandoned.

Id. at 720. The court observed that

the claimant and its predecessors had stood by while the servient
landowner had confined the area claimed for the easement to its own
use during the 35-year period and had acquiesced in the relatively
permanent changes, including the landowner's construction of a high
chain-link fence which enclosed the disputed area and in the sub-
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sequent placing of a chain across the entrance to the area to prevent persons other than the defendant's invitees from using that
portion of the land.

Id. at 720.

Also, in Albanese v. Dominianni, 118 N.Y.S.2d 347 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1953), the court concluded that the easement claimant had
abandoned a driveway easement due to non-use of the easement for
more than 2 0 years and acquiescence in the construction of curbing,
a metal fence, a garden and encroachments prohibiting use of the
easement.
The case of Canadian Nat. Ry. v. Sprague, 609 A.2d 1175 (Me.
1992), also recognized that non-use coupled with an act or omission
inconsistent with the claimed easement may result in abandonment
of the easement.

According to the Court,

[t]o prove abandonment, a party must show (1) a history
of nonuse coupled with an act or omission evincing a
clear intent to abandon, or (2) adverse possession by
the servient estate.
Id. at 1179.

In Sprague. the easement claimant's non-use was for

a period of 40 years.
The undisputed facts in the present case show a similar
history of non-use by plaintiff coupled with acts and omissions
evincing a clear intent on the part of plaintiff to abandon his
claimed easement, as well as adverse possession by defendant and
her predecessors, the Nortons.

(See supra at 10-18.) Those facts

are summarized as follows:
1.

Plaintiff acknowledged in correspondence that the
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old, dilapidated house on his property had been "abandoned."
(R 214-215, 1 8.)
2.

The occupants of Plaintiff's Property, the Ander-

sons, moved from that property in the late 1930s or early
1940s, leaving the home to deteriorate to the point that
animals began to inhabit it for several decades.

(R 214-217,

UH 7, 8 & 17.)
3.

From the late 1930s or early 1940s, no one lived in

the old home, no one used Plaintiff's Property or the easement
claimed by plaintiff, nor did anyone occupy Plaintiff's Property, maintain the house or property, or seek to use the easement claimed by plaintiff to access Plaintiff's Property until
plaintiff attempted to do so in connection with the present
action.
4.

(R 214, 217, 11 7 & 17.)
From at least the mid-1960s until the present time,

the portion of Defendant's Property claimed as an easement
by plaintiff was fenced off and subsequently blocked by a
locked gate.

(R 216-219, 11 13, 19 & 24.)

The Nortons and

defendant never let anyone use that portion of their property for access to the old house or for any other purpose.
(R 217-219, 11 15, 23 & 25.)
5.

From at least the mid-1960s, when the Nortons ac-

quired Defendant's Property, until the present time, a huge
rock pile has existed on the south side of the dilapidated
house on Plaintiff's Property.
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It consists of hundreds of

tons of boulders that could only be removed at a very substantial cost, and it covers a very large portion of Plaintiff's Property, making that portion of the property unusable.
(R 214-215, 1 8.)
6.

Plaintiff and his predecessors stood by for over 30

years, from at least the mid-1960s until plaintiff filed the
present action, and acquiesced in defendant's and her predecessors' blocking of the claimed easement by constructing a
fence, placing "No Trespassing" signs on the fence, plowing
and planting grass within the claimed easement area, and
grazing animals within that area.

(See R 215-219, 11 9, 12,

13, 15, 18, 19, 23 & 25.)
7.

When the Nortons purchased Defendant's Property,

it was obvious that Plaintiff's Property had long since been
abandoned.

(R 217, 1 17.) Not only was the old house dilap-

idated, but there was no evidence in the 1960s of an easement
or lane across the eastern portion of Defendant's Property to
the old house.

(R 215-216, 11 11 & 12.)

The above undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff's Property was abandoned when the Andersons moved away from the property
in the late 1930s or early 1940s.

They show not only non-use of

the property since that time, but conduct by plaintiff and his
predecessors

that is plainly

inconsistent with any intention

to make further use of the property for nearly half a century.
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Only at the time when a lady identified as Mrs. Mower approached
Mr. Norton in the early 1980s did anyone even manifest an intention to cross Defendant's Property to get to the old house.

Even

then, there is no evidence that Mrs. Mower claimed an easement
across the east edge of Defendant's Property.

Accordingly, the

district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that plaintiff
and his predecessors did not abandon the property.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the judgment against defendant
should be reversed in its entirety and judgment should enter in
defendant's favor, establishing that plaintiff's claimed easement
was extinguished by adverse possession.

In the alternative, the

Court should vacate the judgment against defendant and order that
all fact issues relating to adverse possession and abandonment
be tried.
Respectfully submitted this

"2- day of May, 2002.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

E r~r^tki

/

Rex E. Madsen
Attorneys for Appellant/Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on the

7^

day of May, 2002, a

true and correct copy of the above document was mailed, postage
prepaid, to:
Mr. Douglas B. Thayer
Hill, Johnson & Schmutz
3319 North University Avenue, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorneys for Appellee/Plaintiff.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
Rex E. Madsen
Attorneys for Appellant/Defendant

ADDENDUM
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-7, et seq.
Order issued by the Honorable Kay L. Mclff of the Sixth
Judicial District Court, Sanpete County, State of Utah
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JUDICIAL CODE

of the same, shall be effectual, unless it appears that the
person prosecuting the action, or interposing the defense or
counterclaim, or under whose title the action is prosecuted or
defense or counterclaim is made, or the ancestor, predecessor
or grantor of such person was seized or possessed of the
property in question within seven years before the committing
of the act in respect to which such action is prosecuted or
defense or counterclaim made.
1953
78-12-7.

A d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n — P o s s e s s i o n p r e s u m e d in
owner.
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the
possession thereof, the person establishing a legal title to the
property shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof
within the time required by law; and the occupation of the
property by any other person shall be deemed to have been
under and in subordination to the legal title, unless it appears
that the property has been held and possessed adversely to
such legal title for seven years before the commencement of
the action.
1953
78-12-7.1.

A d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n — P r e s u m p t i o n — Prov i s o — Tax title.
In every action for the recovery or possession of real property or to quiet title to or determine the owner thereof the
person establishing a legal title to such property shall be
presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time
required by law; and the occupation of such property by any
other person shall be deemed to have been under and in
subordination to the legal title, unless it appears t h a t such
property has been held and possessed adversely to such legal
title for seven years before the commencement of such action.
Provided, however, that if in any action any party shall
establish prima facie evidence that he is the owner of any real
property under a tax title held by him and his predecessors for
four years prior to the commencement of such action and one
year after the effective date of this amendment he shall be
presumed to be the owner of such property by adverse possession unless it appears that the owner of the legal title or his
predecessor has actually occupied or been in possession of
such property under such title or that such tax title owner and
his predecessors have failed to pay all the taxes levied or
assessed upon such property within such four-year period.
1953

78-12-8. U n d e r written i n s t r u m e n t or j u d g m e n t .
Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those under
whom he claims, entered into possession of the property under
claim of title, exclusive of other right, founding such claim
upon a written instrument as being a conveyance of the
property in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a
competent court, and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of the property included in such instrument, decree or judgment, or of some part of the property
under such claim, for seven years, the property so included is
deemed to have been held adversely, except t h a t when the
property so included consists of a tract divided into lots, the
possession of one lot is not deemed a possession of any other
lot of the same tract.
1953

78-12-9. What constitutes adverse possession under
w r i t t e n instrument.
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by
any person claiming a title founded upon a written instrument
or a judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases:
(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.

(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
(3) Where, although not inclosed, it h a s been used for
the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber, for the purpose of
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husbandry, or for pasturage or for the ordinary use of the
occupant.
(4) Where a known farm or single lot has been partly
improved, the portion of such farm or lot that may have
been left not cleared or not inclosed according to the usual
course and custom of the adjoining county is deemed to
have been occupied for the same length of time as the part
improved and cultivated.
1953
78-12-10.

U n d e r claim not f o u n d e d on w r i t t e n instrum e n t or j u d g m e n t .
Where it appears that there has been an actual continued
occupation of land under claim of title, exclusive of any other
right, but not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or
decree, the land so actually occupied, and no other, is deemed
to have been held adversely.
1953
78-12-11.

What c o n s t i t u t e s a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n not u n der written instrument.
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a
person claiming title, not founded upon a written instrument,
judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed
and occupied in the following cases only:
(1) Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
(2) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
(3) Where labor or money has been expended upon
dams, canals, embankments, aqueducts or otherwise for
the purpose of irrigating such lands amounting to the sum
of $5 per acre.
1953
78-12-12.

P o s s e s s i o n m u s t b e c o n t i n u o u s , and t a x e s
paid.
In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the provisions of any section of this code, unless
it shall be shown t h a t the land has been occupied and claimed
for the period of seven years continuously, and that the party,
his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law.
1953

78-12-12.1. P o s s e s s i o n and p a y m e n t of t a x e s — P r o v i s o
— Tax title.
In no case shall adverse possession be established under the
provisions of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land
has been occupied and claimed for the period of seven years
continuously, and that the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all the taxes which have been levied and
assessed upon such land according to law. Provided, however,
that payment by the holder of a tax title to real property or his
predecessors, of all the taxes levied and assessed upon such
real property after the delinquent tax sale or transfer under
which he claims for a period of not less than four years and for
not less than one year after the effective date of this amendment, shall be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this
section in regard to the payment of taxes necessary to establish adverse possession.
1953
78-12-13. A d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n of public s t r e e t s or w a y s .
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or
to any lands held by any town, city or county, or the corporate
authorities thereof, designated for public use as streets, lanes,
avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, or for any other
public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any length of
time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such
town or city or county or the corporate authorities thereof have
sold, or otherwise disposed of, and conveyed such real estate to
a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and that for more
than seven years subsequent to such conveyance the purchaser, his grantees or successors in interest, have been in the
exclusive, continuous and adverse possession of such real
estate; in which case an adverse title may be acquired.
1953
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS E. MOWER,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
GLORIA MARTINEAU

Judge Kay L.McIff

Defendant.

Civil No. 970600181

This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff was represented by Wade S.
Winegar, Christopher S. Crump and Bruce R. Murdock and Defendant was represented by Rex
E. Madsen. Oral argument was heard on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on April 19,
2000, subsequent to which the Court requested supplemental memoranda from the parties. After
having reviewed the memoranda in support of and in opposition to the parties' motions, together
with the affidavits, exhibits and all other relevant documents on file with the Court, the Court
makes the following ORDER:

z«

UNDISPUTED FACTS
The plaintiff Mower owns a one acre parcel of land in Sanpete County surrounded
on three sides by the property of the defendant Martineau. The Mower and Martineau properties
have a common origin of title. Mower's one acre parcel is adjoined on a fourth side by the
property of Dorothy C. Minor. Minor's property has a different origin of title. There are no
overlaps in the chain of title for the Minor property and the chain of title for the Mower and
Martineau properties.
There is an old home and farm buildings located on Mower's one acre. Mower's
occupancy dates to 1902 though the home has not been occupied for a half century or so. There
is a county road along the north side of the Martineau property. When the Mower home was
occupied or the one acre was otherwise utilized it had access to the county road across the
Martineau property.1 (See Exhibit "A" reflecting the location of properties and roads.)
During the long period of non-use by Mowers, Martineau and her predecessors
cultivated the area covered by the old access road and treated it as part of the adjoining field.
Sometime in 1982, members of the Mower family sought to cross the Martineau property to
access the one acre but were confronted by the then owner, one Norton, who refused to allow the
crossing unless a court order was obtained. This refusal and/or interruption prompted the filing
of the within lawsuit in July of 1997.

1

Martineau initially denied this, but her admissions during discovery establish otherwise.
2

LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Easement by Necessity
Mower has laid a solid foundation for establishment of an easement by necessity.
"An easement by necessity arises 'when there is a conveyance of part of a tract of land which is
so situated that either the part conveyed or the part retained is surrounded with no access to a
road to the outer world'." Potter v. Chadaz, 977 P.2d 533, 538 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (quoting
Tschaggeny v. Union Pacific Land Resources Corp., 555 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1976)).
It is clear from the undisputed facts that there was a unity of title followed by
severance and that the easement to access the Mower parcel was reasonably necessary to the
enjoyment of that property. Mower's predecessors owned all of the property. The severance
occurred in 1902. There was no unity of title involving the Minor property (adjoining Mower on
the fourth side) and accordingly no easement by necessity could have arisen across the Minor
property.
B. Abandonment
Some jurisdictions seem to reject the notion that a way of necessity can be
extinguished by abandonment. The underlying notion is that the easement arises by necessity
and must continue so long as the necessity exists. See, e.g. Berkley Development Corp. v.
Huntzler, 229 S.E.2d 732 (W.Va. 1976). Other jurisdictions, apparently the more common,
recognize the possibility of extinguishment by abandonment but such is not created solely by
non-use. The majority of jurisdictions appear to require that the non-use be accompanied by
3

some affirmative manifestation evidencing clear intent to abandon. See, e.g., Conner v. Lucas,
By and Through Lucas, 920 P.2d 171 (Or. App. 1996) and other cases cited in footnote 4 of
Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Utah does not appear to have faced the issue but this court is persuaded that when
and if it does it will require evidence of an actual intent to abandon and will not imply the same
solely from non-use. Moreover, it is not unlikely that it will require clear and convincing
evidence of an intent to abandon. That conclusion is premised on the nature of an easement by
necessity. It arises because without it the severed land becomes essentially useless.2 Property
rights have uniformly received highly favorable treatment by Utah courts and great caution
should be taken to avoid rendering a parcel valueless.
In this court's view, abandonment and prescription are not synonymous. Use or
non-use in the face of challenge are the subject matter of prescriptive rights. Defendant's claim
of loss by prescription is treated hereafter. Defendant's claim of abandonment relies solely upon
evidence of non-use. She offers nothing evidencing an affirmative manifestation of intent to
abandon on Mower's part. Accordingly, she fails to create a triable issue of fact on this point.

2

In an affidavit support Defendant Martineau's position, her predecessor, Norton,
expresses a belief that plaintiff wants to create enough of a nuisance that defendants would buy
the one acre parcel just to be rid of the problem. He indicates this would create "an atmosphere
of supposed coercion." There is a reverse side to this. If defendant can completely land-lock
plaintiff, then the defendant becomes the sole and only potential buyer. Plaintiffs bargaining
strength would be reduced to virtually nil.
4

C. Adverse Possession
Martineau seeks summary judgment under a theory of adverse possession. She
relies specifically on Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-8 and 12. These sections require continuous
occupancy and payment of real property taxes for a period of seven years. These sections relate
to acquisition of the basic fee title and have not been relied on by Utah courts in relation to
prescriptive easements. The early Utah case of Harkness v. Woodmansee, 1 Utah 227 (Utah
1891)flatlystates: "This statute [Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-8 and 12] does not apply torightsof
way or any other class of easement by prescription." The seven year adverse possession period
cannot be relied upon to create a prescriptive easement, Id., nor can it be relied upon to
extinguish it. As noted in the Harkness decision, the twenty year requirement for a prescriptive
easement had its origin in eighteenth century English common law. It is simply a different kind
of creature than the adverse possession statutory scheme. Defendant appears to have taken her
cue in this case from an improvident and unsupportable acknowledgment by plaintiff in his
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment. In
footnote 5, page 11, plaintiff states,
However, Utah generally recognizes that easements can be lost through adverse
possession. See Coleman Co. v. Southwest Field Irrigation Co., 584P.2d 883
(Utah 1978 and Riverside Country Club v. Ashton, 506 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1973).
This court does not consider either of the cited cases as supporting plaintiffs
statement. In Riverside, the older of the two cases, the appellant raised three arguments. Each
was summarily rejected without analysis. One argument was that a claimed easement had been

5

destroyed by adverse possession. The court concluded that this "was not shown by satisfactory
evidence." The opinion is abbreviated, contains no analysis and cites no legal authority. The
reference to extinguishment of an easement by adverse possession rises only to the level of a
summarily rejected claim. The same is essentially true of the Coleman case cited by plaintiff.
The whole of the discussion in Coleman is as follows: "The trial court correctly observed that
plaintiff acquired no right by adverse possession simply be relocating the easement, and in any
event, it was not an adverse act at all because it was acquiesced in by Old Fort." Coleman at
884. [Emphasis by the Court.]
These cases provide no authority for the proposition that the statutory doctrine of
adverse possession should be applied to prescriptive easements. The overlap is limited to the
concept of adversity, though sometimes insufficient care is employed when the terms are used by
courts.
D. Loss by Prescription
If the owner of the servient estate uses his land in a manner which is adverse to
the interests of the owner of the easement for a period of twenty years, the time required for the
acquisition of prescriptive rights, the easement may be subject to termination. (Restatement of
property, § 506.) The undisputed evidence before this court is that the moment of truth did not
arise between these parties until 1982 when plaintiff sought access and defendant's predecessor
flatly denied the same absent a court order. That is "adversity". Both sides have agreed that this

6

started the clock to run, but Martineau seeks to apply the seven year period under the statutory
adverse possession law. It has no application. The required period is twenty years.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has established an easement by necessity. Defendant has failed to offer
any evidence of an affirmative manifestation of intent to abandon. There is no triable issue on
this point. Defendant has established prevention of use of the easement between 1982 and the
filing of this action in 1997, a period of fifteen years. The statutory adverse possession scheme
relying on possession and payment of taxes for seven years has no application. Creation as well
as extinguishment of prescriptive rights requires twenty years. The facts do not comply with this
requirement. Defendant's motion for summary judgment fails. Plaintiff is entitled to summary
judgment reestablishing the old lane across the east edge of defendant's property running
between the county road and the Mower property and limited to the width of historical use.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED:
1. That there are no triable issues of material fact, and therefore, as a matter of
law, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in his favor. Thus, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted and Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
2. Plaintiff Thomas E. Mower is entitled to an easement over the east edge of the
following described real property, limited to the width of historical use:

7

Beginning at the Northwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of Section 24,
Township 13 South, Range 4 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence
South 5.00 chains, thence East 4.60 chains, thence South 1.30 chains, thence East
15.40 chains, thence North 6.30 chains, thence West 20.00 chains to the point of
beginning, containing 12.0 acres.
DATED this

District CourfrTSanpete County.

Approved as to Form
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Rex E. Madsen
Attorney for Defendant

8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3jr3ay of August, 2001,1 caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to the following by the method indicated
below:
Rex Madsen
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

(^TtJS. POSTAGE PREPAID MAIL
( ) FACSIMILE
( ) HAND DELIVERED
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